Measurement of mineral supply diversity and its importance in assessing risk and criticality by Brown, Teresa
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Resources Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/resourpol
Measurement of mineral supply diversity and its importance in assessing risk
and criticality
Teresa Brown
British Geological Survey, Environmental Science Centre, Keyworth, Nottingham NG12 5GG, UK








A B S T R A C T
The diversity of supply, or conversely its concentration, has become one of the key factors in measuring the
criticality of minerals. The premise is that if supply is limited to just a few major suppliers the risk of supply
disruption is increased, although in reality it depends on many more factors that can be complicated to measure.
In addition, there is a wide range of possible methods for measuring supply diversity or concentration, some
involving the use of complicated formulas, which can easily become bewildering to the non-statistician. Often
the intricacies of their use, the data inputs and sources, and the resulting indices, are not fully understood with
the consequent risk of misinformed decisions being based upon them. This paper examines a selection of the
available indicators, discusses their limitations and illustrates how a simple index, such as concentration ratio,
can be as informative as more complicated approaches. Further, it uses the trends in supply diversity for ﬁve
minerals (ﬂuorspar, lithium, coal, copper and nickel), taken at decadal intervals over the past century, to de-
monstrate that a snapshot index taken at a single point in time does not accurately determine whether the level
of supply concentration is a cause for concern.
1. Introduction
The concept of raw materials ‘criticality’ is not new (see Glöser
et al., 2015 for a useful summary, particularly of the 20th and 21st
centuries) but it has become one of the most frequently discussed topics
in recent times with, for example, the number of papers on the subject
published in 2000–2011 more than treble that of 1990–1999 (Speirs
et al., 2013). The dictionary deﬁnitions of the term ‘criticality’ state that
these materials are those of “highest importance”, which implies a
usefulness that would make them almost essential. In recent years
materials have been described as ‘critical’ usually because there is some
perceived risk that they might become scarce or not routinely available
for modern technology. Graedel et al. (2014) provide a useful in-
troduction to the subject and describe some of the associated com-
plexities.
A signiﬁcant number of studies have been conducted to assess
whether a range of metals or materials can be deﬁned as ‘critical’, each
using diﬀerent sets of criteria and diverse methodologies (e.g. National
Research Council, 2008; European Commission, 2010, 2014 and 2017;
British Geological Survey, 2015; Graedel et al., 2015; Gemechu et al.,
2015; McCullough and Nassar, 2017). However, one aspect that is
common to all these studies is an assessment of ‘supply risk’ or the ‘risk
of supply disruption’ and the assessment of this factor always includes
some measure of ‘supply concentration’ (Speirs et al., 2013). The
premise is that if the supply of a material is limited to a few countries
the risk of supply disruption is increased, although in reality the si-
tuation is much more complicated than this.
The concentration of the supply of a material to a few countries can
cause prices to rise or become more volatile as competition for the
material increases and concerns grow about possible supply constraints
(De Groot et al., 2012). Rising or volatile prices and concerns about
supply restriction may also result in consuming industries seeking to
make signiﬁcant changes such as material substitution, redesign of
products to use less of the material or increased use of alternative
sources e.g. from recycled products (Graedel et al., 2014). These kinds
of industrial changes can have serious consequences for costs and
proﬁtability (McLelland et al., 2014; Hendricks and Singhal, 2005).
Some of the ‘criticality’ studies have attempted to incorporate market
volatility into the assessment of whether a mineral is critical (e.g.
McCullough and Nassar, 2017). There are also a number of actions that
may be taken at government level such as funding research to improve
processing technologies, supporting exploration or legislation aimed at
improving recycling rates (Graedel et al., 2014).
Most of the ‘criticality’ studies that have been carried out should be
considered as providing an ‘early warning’ of potential problems. The
actual supply of materials is a complex web of interconnected compa-
nies and countries with a wide variety of inﬂuencing factors, which
requires more detailed analysis if a full understanding of the system is
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to be obtained (McCullough and Nasser, 2017).
In the context of global studies ‘production’ is used a proxy for
‘supply’ and potential supply from stockpiles is ignored. For clarity, the
term ‘production concentration’ is the direct opposite of ‘production
diversity’ (Acar and Bhatnagar, 2003).
In many cases the measure used for ‘production concentration’ is the
Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI), which is described more fully later
in this paper. But the use of HHI has its complexities and there are also
other measures that can be used to make comparable assessments.
Furthermore, it could be argued that it is not the production con-
centration itself that is the issue in determining a mineral's criticality
but rather the potential geopolitical issues associated with the supply
concentration. Statistical measures also exist that quantitatively mea-
sure dominance in a market and, as this paper demonstrates, these can
also be applied on a global scale.
This paper uses a dataset from the British Geological Survey (BGS)
known as “World Mineral Statistics” to examine the diversity or con-
centration of production for ﬁve mineral commodities: ﬂuorspar, li-
thium, coal, copper and nickel. This dataset contains over 100 years of
annualised production data by country and consequently enables the
examination of how mineral supply diversity has changed over the last
century. A range of established statistical measures are presented and
compared in order to draw conclusions about their usefulness and us-
ability in the context of mineral commodities.
The World Mineral Statistics dataset commenced with the publica-
tion of “The Mineral Industry of the British Empire and Foreign
Countries, Statistical Summary (Production, Imports and Exports)” by
the Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau in 1921 (IMRB, 1921). This ﬁrst
volume, containing statistics for 43 mineral commodities for the years
1913–1919 listed by country worldwide, was the direct result of supply
restrictions incurred during the First World War. The Imperial War
Conference of 1917 recommended the formation of the Bureau, which
received a Royal Charter in 1919, expressly for the purpose of collecting
and disseminating information relating to mineral resources for the
beneﬁt of defence and industry (Imperial War Conference, 1918).
Over the subsequent decades the annual publication incurred many
changes, not least the removal of references to the “British Empire” and
the somewhat disparaging “Foreign Countries” in the 1950s. Many
countries have become uniﬁed, dissolved into constituent parts or
adopted new names, reﬂecting 100 years of social and political change.
The number of commodities covered by the dataset has increased such
that recent volumes, now called “World Mineral Production”, contain
statistics for more than 70 mineral commodities (e.g. Brown et al.,
2017). Metrication of units occurred in the early 1970s followed by the
introduction of a storage database in the early 1990s and the digital
dissemination of the statistics via an online archive in 2012 and data
download tool in 2014.
Today, the World Mineral Statistics dataset continues to be main-
tained by the BGS and “World Mineral Production” is still published
annually. The entire series of publications have been scanned and made
available online and the statistics from 1970 onwards can be down-
loaded directly into MS Excel. The dataset itself is almost unique
globally, with only the United States Geological Survey having one that
is comparable in terms of the numbers of years encompassed.
2. Supply statistics
The ﬁve commodities discussed in this paper were selected on the
basis that they would likely reveal diﬀerent levels of production con-
centration. These include commodities where supply appears to have
become more concentrated over time, with one producer believed to be
dominant (ﬂuorspar, lithium) and commodities for which supply ap-
pears to have become more diverse in recent years, albeit still with one
notably large producer (coal, copper). Production of the ﬁfth com-
modity (nickel) does not appear to be signiﬁcantly concentrated in any
single country. The data presented here are based on ‘mine production’
of these commodities (reported as metal content for lithium, copper and
nickel) and are shown against the country in which they were extracted.
Due to the size of the dataset, sample intervals of 10 years have been
used to display and assess how the output of producing countries have
changed with time. It is assumed that these sample years are reﬂective
of the entire decade from which they are taken, but these samples do
not represent an amalgamation of the entire decade and it is possible
that additional countries may have started and then ceased production
in between the selected years. Countries producing smaller quantities of
the commodity have been grouped as ‘Other countries’ in Figs. 1–5 to
improve the clarity of the graphs. The data used to generate the graphs
in this paper are available in the supplementary information (Tables S1
to S10) and, speciﬁcally, the total numbers of producing countries in
any sample year are shown in Table S6.
Fig. 1. Global production of ﬂuorspar at decadal intervals from 1913 to 2013 (data from BGS, 2017).
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2.1. Fluorspar
Fluorspar is an industrial mineral predominantly consisting of cal-
cium ﬂuoride, also known as ﬂuorite (CaF2) (Bide, 2011; Fulton and
Miller, 2006). As shown in Fig. 1, in 2013 China was the largest pro-
ducer of ﬂuorspar with 72% of the world's total output, but in 1963
China only produced 9% of the world's total and Mexico was the largest
producer with 22% (Table S1). However, China's growing dominance
becomes clear from 1993 because, although total global production
reduced compared to 1983, China's share of production increased to
53%.
2.2. Lithium
Lithium is a soft, highly reactive alkali metal with excellent elec-
trical conductivity (Brown, 2016; Evans, 2014). The global production
of lithium was ﬁrst recorded in the World Mineral Statistics dataset in
1925 and was absent from the editions covering the early 1970s.
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Fig. 2, the data show that the world's
total output has increased dramatically since 1993. The ﬁgures are
shown on a tonnes lithium content basis in order that comparison can
be made between two contrasting production sources. Prior to the late
1960s all lithium was extracted using conventional mining and pro-
cessing techniques from ores containing minerals such as spodumene,
petalite, lepidolite, amblygonite and eucryptite. However, since 1966
another source of lithium has been utilised in the form of brine waters
from beneath salt pans, or salars, at a signiﬁcantly lower production
cost. Lithium from this source was ﬁrst extracted in California, USA and
resulted in a noticeable increase in production as shown in the data
from 1974 onwards. Subsequently brine waters have been utilised for
lithium extraction in the Andes of Chile and Argentina, as evident in the
later decades on Fig. 2. Chinese production is derived from both
sources. Production by conventional mining has generally declined in
most countries, with the exception of Australia where the
Fig. 2. Global production of lithium at decadal intervals from 1933 to 2013 (data from BGS, 2017).
Fig. 3. Global production of coal at decadal intervals from 1913 to 2013 (data from BGS, 2017).
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commencement of lithium production in 1983 from a large, relatively
high-grade deposit has sustained production growth.
In 1933 the world's largest producer was Portugal with 78% of
global production. This was followed by several decades when the USA
was the leading producer with up to 72% of the global total in 1983.
Since then Chile and Australia have overtaken the USA and in 2013
Argentina also produced more lithium, as shown in Table S2.
2.3. Coal
Coal is an energy mineral, comprised of lithiﬁed plant remains with
mineral impurities and water (Kendall et al., 2010; Speight, 2013). As
shown in Fig. 3, some of the most notable changes over the last century
are the decline in output from the United Kingdom from 292 million
tonnes in 1913 to less than 13 million tonnes in 2013, the emergence of
the Soviet Union as a major coal producer between the 1950s and 1980s
followed by its separation into smaller republics and the growth of
production from countries such as India and Indonesia. However, the
dominant feature of the graph is the enormous growth in production
from China.
This growth is also evident in Table S3, which shows the percentage
contribution to global production by the world's leading producers. In
1913 China contributed 1% to the world's total output of coal but had
risen to 48% in 2013. In contrast, although production tonnages have
increased, the USA's contribution to the global total reduced from 39%
in 1913 to 12% in 2013.
2.4. Copper
Copper is a non-ferrous base metal and is the third most consumed
industrial metal (after iron and aluminium) (Lusty and Hannis, 2009;
Ayres et al., 2002). In 2013 Chile was the largest global miner of copper
Fig. 4. Global mine production of copper at decadal intervals from 1913 to 2013 (data from BGS, 2017).
Fig. 5. Global mine production of nickel at decadal intervals from 1913 to 2013 (data from BGS, 2017).
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(measured here by copper content) but, as Fig. 4 shows, this is a rela-
tively recent development. From 1913 to the 1970s the world's largest
producer was the USA. However, since the 1970s whilst the USA's
output has remained relatively consistent, slightly declining in some
decades, mine production from Chile has grown signiﬁcantly. Other
countries have also increased output or started producing with the ef-
fect that the USA's contribution to the global total production has de-
clined from 56% in 1913 to just 7% in 2013 (Table S4). By contrast,
Chile's contribution to the world's total mine output has grown from 4%
in 1913 to 32% in 2013. It is also notable that in 2013 the world's
second largest producer of mined copper was China but its contribution
to the global total production was only 9%, although that has increased
from less than 1% in 1953.
2.5. Nickel
Nickel is a hard, ductile and malleable base metal that readily forms
alloys (Bide et al., 2008; Reck and Rotter, 2012). The world's total
production of mined nickel has increased considerably in the most re-
cent decade reaching nearly 2.6 million tonnes of contained nickel in
2013, a 97% increase compared to 2003. In 2013 the largest producing
country was Indonesia but Russia, Canada, the Philippines, Australia
and New Caledonia also made a signiﬁcant contribution to supply
(Fig. 5). In previous decades, Canada had been the dominant producing
country with contributions to the world's total output ranging from 37%
in 1973 to 91% in 1923 (Table S5). In terms of global production,
Canada was overtaken by the USSR in 1983, by Russia in 1993, Aus-
tralia in 2003 and by Indonesia and the Philippines in 2013.
3. Measuring supply concentration or diversity
The data presented in the previous section clearly shows how the
largest mineral producing countries have changed over time, but does
not quantify the degree of production concentration of a particular
commodity. Furthermore, they do not explicitly indicate whether a
producing country is ‘dominant’ in the supply of a commodity nor
provide a quantitative measurement of how dominant a particular
country may be. This information is necessary to determine whether
there should be any cause for concern as production concentration is
generally considered to increase the risk of supply disruption, a major
factor in determining criticality (Buijs and Siever, 2011).
Supply can be restricted on a variety of scales. Events such as nat-
ural disasters, political upheaval, industrial accidents or employee
strikes can all cause the supply from a single mine, region or country, to
be disrupted (Long et al., 2012). Furthermore, a dominant position by
one producer, whether a company or a country, can have impacts on
commodity pricing or result in supply restrictions associated with ex-
port quotas or taxes. An example of the latter situation is evident from a
dispute brought before the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by the
USA and others against China with regards to rare earths, tungsten and
molybdenum (WTO, 2015). These kinds of issues are not inevitable but,
depending on which country is dominant, when they do happen they
may give rise to concern. Increased risk of supply disruption can lead to
changes in government policies or regulations and may inﬂuence de-
cisions on the need for strategic stockpiles.
As mentioned in Section 10.0, a number of studies have in-
corporated production concentration into calculations of ‘supply risk’,
an essential part of assessing the ‘criticality’ of a mineral. For example,
production concentration is one of the seven criteria used in the ‘Risk
List’ published by BGS to determine the relative supply risk of 41 ele-
ments. In the calculations used to produce this list, the percentage of
world supply from the top three producers was determined and con-
centration was considered as ‘high’ if it was greater than 66.6%,
‘medium’ if it was between 33.3% and 66.6% and ‘low’ if it was below
33.3% (BGS, 2015). Other studies on raw material criticality have in-
corporated production concentration, alongside many other factors, by
using statistical indices (e.g. European Commission 2011 and 2014;
Coulomb et al., 2015).
A number of statistical measures have been developed for mea-
suring concentration in a market at a company level. Governments and
regulators worldwide have used these measures as part of their policy-
making processes to ensure eﬀective competition in speciﬁc markets
(e.g. Competition and Markets Authority, 2010). Acar and Bhatnagar
(2003) brieﬂy describe the evolution of these statistical measures and
identify a range of techniques that could be used. The following section
applies some of these measures to assess the concentration of mineral
production on a global scale.
3.1. Number of producers
Acar and Bhatnagar (2003) describe the simplest measure of di-
versity within a company as the number of product lines that it pro-
duces. It follows that the simplest measure of diversity in a market is the
number of producing companies (Competition and Markets Authority,
2010). The same principle can be used to describe diversity in mineral
supply on a global scale by examining the number of producing coun-
tries.
For the ﬁve commodities considered in this paper, Table S6 shows
the number of producing countries for each sample year, which is also
shown graphically on Fig. 6. Whilst in general the number of producing
countries has increased during the century, there are some signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the trends between the earlier and later decades. The
perception may be that the supply of ﬂuorspar and lithium has become
less diverse but this is only true in the latter part of the century, with
both minerals showing signiﬁcant increases in the number of producers
in the earlier decades. Although there has been an obvious increase in
the number of countries producing copper between 2003 and 2013
there was a comparable reduction in the number of producing countries
between 1983 and 1993. Only for nickel is the number of producing
countries higher in 2013 than at any other point during the last century.
However, this measure does not consider the size of a single pro-
ducer relative to the total amount produced and it will also be aﬀected
by the uniﬁcation of countries or the separation of single jurisdictions
into multiple independent states. The number of producers does have
an impact on the results calculated using many of the other statistical
indices and this is discussed in Section 4.1.
3.2. Concentration ratio (CR)
Economists and competition authorities have traditionally used
concentration ratios to measure the extent of market control by the
largest companies in a particular industry. This ratio measures the re-
lative size of the largest group of companies compared to the size of the
entire market (Pettinger, 2012). It will identify whether a market is
monopolistic, oligopolistic or diversiﬁed and can be calculated based on
any number of the largest companies (often the top three, four or ﬁve).
It is also relatively simple in that it requires only the calculation of the
Fig. 6. Trends in the number of producing countries, data at decadal intervals
* 1974 for lithium (Data from BGS, 2017).
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total market share held by these top producers (Eq. (1)).
= + + …CR S S Sn 1 2 n (1)
Where n represents the number of producers included in the calculation
and S represents the market share of each producer. Values close to
100% indicate markets that are close to monopolistic (a monopoly
would have a CR1 value of 100%), CR5 values greater than 50% are
likely to be considered oligopolistic (although the threshold may vary)
(Pettinger, 2012), whereas the most diversiﬁed markets will have va-
lues closer to 0%. This measure can be applied to producing countries
on a global scale by considering the percentage of the world total
contributed by the top producing countries instead of company market
shares.
For the ﬁve commodities considered in this paper, Table S7 illus-
trates how the concentration ratio has changed over the century based
on the top 4 producing countries and these data are shown graphically
in Fig. 7. The data appear to show that the production of nickel, copper
and lithium have become less concentrated over time. Production of
ﬂuorspar became less concentrated between 1913 and 1973 but since
then has become considerably more concentrated. Concentration ratios
do not fall below 49% for any of these commodities in any year, which
suggests that the supply of all these commodities could be considered
oligopolistic in most years.
This measure is less illustrative when there are fewer producing
countries overall than when there are many countries because the re-
sults are naturally closer to 100% when there are fewer producers.
Increasing the number of producers included in the calculation will
result in higher percentages so the selection of how many is particularly
important. It also does not provide any information regarding the scale
of production of the top producing countries relative to each other and
consequently it does not indicate the dominance, or otherwise, of a
single country. This measure is, however, simple to calculate and the
results are straightforward to interpret.
3.3. Hirschman-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI)
The HHI has become one of the standard tools used to assess the
concentration of companies within a market and is therefore used fre-
quently by competition authorities and economists. It was proposed
independently by A.O. Hirschman in 1945 and O.C. Herﬁndahl in 1950
as a measure of concentration in an industry and therefore of compe-
tition between companies (Hirschman, 1945; Herﬁndahl, 1950). It is
calculated as the sum of the squares of company market shares (Eq.
(2)).
= + + …HHI S S Sn12 22 2 (2)
Where S represents the market share of each producer in turn and n
represents the total number of producers. The market share ﬁgures
resulting from this ‘un-normalised’ HHI can be quoted either as a dec-
imal or as a whole number (i.e. a market share of 35% may be shown as
0.35 or 35). If decimal numbers are used the HHI calculation results in a
number between 1/n and 1. If whole numbers are used the HHI results
in a ﬁgure between 1/n and 10,000.
According to the United States Department of Justice (2010), HHI
calculated using whole numbers resulting in a ﬁgure above 2500 re-
presents a market that can be considered to have high concentration, a
value between 1500 and 2500 represents a market of moderate con-
centration and a value below 1500 represents a market that is not
concentrated. The equivalent ﬁgures if HHI is calculated using decimals
are over 0.25 (high concentration), between 0.15 and 0.25 (moderate
concentration) and below 0.15 (low concentration).
In the UK, the Competition and Market Authority (CMA) guidelines
(2010) provide slightly diﬀerent thresholds for HHI (again calculated
using whole numbers) of 1000 for a concentrated market and 2000 for a
highly concentrated market. These guidelines also provide thresholds
for changes in HHI as a result of a merger between two companies,
stating that a change of less than 250 in a concentrated market, or less
than 150 in a highly concentrated one, would be unlikely to cause
concern (Competition and Market Authority, 2010).
HHI can also be calculated on a ‘normalised’ basis such that the
results range between 0 and 1 when the calculation is performed using
decimal ﬁgures to represent the market shares (Eq. (3)).
=HHI* (HHI–1/n)/(1–1/n) (3)
Where HHI* represents the normalised version, HHI is the un-normal-
ised version of the index and n is the total number of producers. Nor-
malising the index has both advantages and disadvantages as described
in Section 4. HHI (or HHI*) can be applied to mineral producing
countries on a global scale by considering their share of the total world
production instead of company market shares. This index was pre-
viously used in a similar context, in the European Commission raw
material criticality assessment (EC, 2010, 2014). Table S8 shows the
calculated HHI values for the ﬁve commodities and the 11 sample years
considered in this paper, with part a) containing the un-normalised HHI
values and part b) the normalised HHI values. These are illustrated
graphically in Fig. 8.
Notably, for all ﬁve of the selected commodities the un-normalised
HHI values are ‘highly concentrated’ for 1913 and 1923 based on the
thresholds set by the UK CMA. Copper and coal fall into the ‘con-
centrated’ range from 1933 and generally remain in this range for the
Fig. 7. Trends in concentration ratios for the top 4 producing countries, data at
decadal intervals *1974 for lithium (Data from BGS, 2017).
Fig. 8. Trends in HHI, data at decadal intervals, part a) are un-normalised, part
b) are normalised; both calculated using market shares expressed as decimals.
*1974 for lithium (Data from BGS, 2017).
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remainder of the period considered. The HHI value for ﬂuorspar falls
into the ‘concentrated’ range in 1953, crosses into the ‘not con-
centrated’ range in 1973, but then rises above the ‘highly concentrated’
threshold from 1993 onwards and continues to increase. Fluorspar has
the highest HHI value in 2013 of all ﬁve commodities considered. The
HHI for nickel shows the most signiﬁcant decrease in values across the
century, having the highest values of the ﬁve commodities in all the
sample years up to 1953 and only falling below the ‘highly con-
centrated’ threshold from 1983. Its HHI value has remained above the
‘concentrated’ threshold in each subsequent decade.
The HHI appears to be a useful tool for assessing the concentration
of global supply of these minerals. However, it is more complicated to
calculate than concentration ratio and there is the potential for some
misunderstanding due to there being both normalised and un-normal-
ised versions of the index, as discussed further in Section 4.
This analysis clearly demonstrates that the production of nickel, in
particular, has become signiﬁcantly less concentrated in supply since
1943 despite the small increase in concentration in 2013. In contrast,
production of ﬂuorspar has become much more concentrated in supply
since 1983, but the perception of how signiﬁcant this change is could be
partially aﬀected by the low HHI values in the middle of the century
and the speed at which this increase happened. Comparing the un-
normalised HHI value of ﬂuorspar in 2013 (0.53) with that in 1913
(0.55) suggests it may not be as signiﬁcant as it ﬁrst appears.
These HHI ﬁgures do not identify which country or countries are the
largest producers or whether any of the leading producers are likely to
be able to exercise dominance in the market.
3.4. Percentage market share (S)
In economics the term ‘dominance’ is a measure of the strength of a
particular product or company in the market place. This is relevant to
the global supply of minerals because a dominant producing country
could exert inﬂuence over prices by restricting supplies to other coun-
tries. Furthermore, a country could use a dominant position to provide
an unfair advantage to its domestic industry or to apply export re-
strictions or tariﬀs (e.g. WTO, 2015; Bradsher, 2010). However, the
presence of dominance does not itself result in anti-competitive prac-
tices rather it is the abuse of dominance that causes problems
(Competition Bureau, 2015). On a global scale, useful indices have been
developed to give an indication of which countries may be more or less
inclined to this kind of behaviour, e.g. the World Bank's Worldwide
Governance Indicators (World Bank, 2018) and the Fraser Institute's
Investment Attractiveness Index (Stedman and Green, 2018). The
former includes indicators for: ‘political stability’, ‘government eﬀec-
tiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’ and ‘control of corruption’, amongst
others. The latter includes indicators for ‘policy perception’ (which it-
self consists of sub-indicators for undertainty surrounding regulations,
the legal system, political stability, trade barriers, etc.) and ‘mineral
potential’ (which relates to geology).
There are a number of ways of calculating dominance; the simplest
is the percentage of the total market supplied by one company or
product (Eq. (4)). In the world of commerce, a company with a market
share exceeding 60% would be considered to have market dominance.
A company with a market share of more than 35% but less than 60%
would have market strength but not necessarily dominance. A market in
which no company has more than a 35% market share would suggest no
company has strength or dominance and is unlikely to raise concerns
with competition regulators (Competition Bureau, 2015).
=S (P /T)*100i i (4)
Where S is the percentage market share, i represents the individual
producer, P is the production from that producer and T is the total
quantity produced in the market. This can be applied to global mineral
supply by examining the percentage contribution of the top producing
countries to the world's total output. Tables S1-S5 contain the percen-
tage shares of the top producing countries for the ﬁve minerals con-
sidered. Fig. 9 contains the percentage share of just the single top
producer in each country and the identity of this country is shown in
the data table below the graph.
For ﬂuorspar, two countries have had market dominance at dif-
ferent times during the century: the USA in 1913 (66% of the world's
total production) and China in 2013 (72%). In two other years each of
these two countries have also had market strength: the USA in 1923 and
1943 and China in 1993 and 2003. It is notable that the three years
mentioned for China are the most recent.
With regards to lithium, market strength and dominance have
varied over the sample years for which statistics are available. In 1933,
Portugal had market dominance but by 1943 this had changed to the
U.S.A. In 1963 it had changed to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), probably
Fig. 9. Trends in the market share of the leading
producer at decadal intervals. The identity of that
leading producer has changed over time as shown
in the data table. In the table dominant producers
based on market share are coloured red, producers
with strength but not dominance are coloured or-
ange. *1974 for lithium (Data from BGS, 2017).
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due to the opening of the large Bikita Mine. However, this may be af-
fected by the absence of data for the U.S.A. in that year. Market dom-
inance switched back to the U.S.A. in 1974 and 1983. In the most recent
two decades, no country has had dominance but the growth of pro-
duction in Chile has provided it with market strength.
Market dominance for mine production of nickel rested with Canada
for the ﬁrst half of the century with its contribution to global produc-
tion of nickel reaching as high as 91% in 1923. Canada continued to
have market strength in 1963 and 1973 but since then no country has
produced a suﬃcient quantity of nickel to cross that threshold.
It is signiﬁcant to note that the trend lines for market shares in Fig. 9
are very similar to those for HHI in Fig. 8. This is not surprising when
you consider that HHI is calculated based on market shares (see Eq.
(2)). The diﬀerence with HHI is that the market shares are squared and
all producers are included whereas in Fig. 9 only the largest producer in
each year is shown.
3.5. Kwoka's Dominance Index (D)
This index was developed by John E Kwoka Jr in 1977 (Kwoka,
1977) with the intention that it would be an improved measure of
‘inequality’ in the size of companies within a market. The performance
of commercial markets would appear to be dependent not only on the
individual company's market share but on the size of the gap between
the market share of the largest company and its competitors. A greater
size inequality enables the largest company to exploit market pricing
more eﬀectively and thereby enhance its proﬁtability.
Kwoka's index is calculated as the sum of the squares of market
share diﬀerences when companies are ranked by size (Eq. (5)).
∑=
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Where S means the market share of each producer ranked by size, i
represents each individual producer in turn and n is the total number of
producers. The values range from 1/n2 to 1. A result of 1 represents a
monopolistic market while values close to 0 mean that no single com-
pany can exercise power in the market. The literature is unclear on how
high the value needs to be to indicate a dominant producer (e.g.
d’Outreville, 1998; Ruthenberg, 2006). However, the trends produced
using the index are informative for the purposes of this paper.
This index can be used to analyse global minerals supply by repla-
cing market shares with each country's percentage contribution to the
world's production of a mineral. Table S9 shows the calculated values
for Kwoka's dominance index for the ﬁve commodities and eleven years
considered and these values are shown graphically in Fig. 10.
With regards to lithium, the dominance index is quite variable and
with values above 0.3 in 1933, 1943, 1963 and 1983 there have clearly
been countries with greater dominance of global supply than for copper
or coal. For these years, the largest producers were Portugal, the USA,
Rhodesia and the USA, with shares of global supply of 78%, 70%, 88%
and 72%, respectively. In contrast the dominance index has reduced to
about 0.1 in the three most recent sample years, which coincides with
the emergence of Chile and Australia as signiﬁcant producers.
The dominance index for ﬂuorspar shows comparable values to
copper for each year until 1993, with the largest producer being the
USA until 1953, Mexico in 1963 and 1973 and Mongolia in 1983.
However, from 1993 the emergence of supply from China becomes
apparent with its share of global production increasing sharply from
12% in 1983 to 53% in 1993 and the dominance index increases from
0.01 in 1983–0.22 in 1993. A small dip in the dominance index for
2003 is related to a rise in the global share from the second producer,
Mexico (from 7% to 17%), which had the eﬀect of keeping China's
contribution to global production at 53% despite a rise in actual pro-
duction quantity. However, a very large increase in China's production
of ﬂuorspar by 2013 has caused its share of the global total to increase
to 72% in 2013. In comparison Mexico's proportion of the total global
production reduced to 13% in 2013 despite an overall rise in produc-
tion from the country. These two factors combined have caused the
dominance index to rise to 0.35.
The dominance index for nickel shows a completely diﬀerent pat-
tern with values in excess of 0.3 only in 1923, 1933 and 1943 when
Canada was the largest producer with a share of global supply greater
than 80% in each decade. A signiﬁcant decline in Canada's percentage
of the total, caused initially by the emergence of supply from other
producers rather than an actual fall in production, reduced the dom-
inance index from 0.57 in 1943–0.21 in 1953. Since then the index has
continued to decline, reaching a low in 2003 of just 0.01. In that period
Canada has been overtaken as the largest producer by Russia, then
Australia and more recently by Indonesia and the Philippines.
3.6. Entropy measure of diversiﬁcation (E)
Unlike the other statistical measures reviewed, the use of entropy is
a direct measure of diversity rather than concentration. Consequently,
whereas calculated values for the concentration ratio or HHI are lower
where a market place is more diverse and higher when it is more
concentrated, calculated values of entropy are larger when a market
place is more diverse and lower when it is closer to a monopoly.
Entropy is calculated by multiplying the market share of a company
or product by the logarithm of that market share and then summing the
results (while also converting the negative number that results into a
positive number) (Eq. (6)).
∑=
=





Where S represents the market share, i the individual company within
the market and n the total number of producers. If a company or market
has a monopoly the index would calculate to 0 and the maximum value
that can be calculated is the logarithm of n. As with the other measures,
it is adapted for the context of this paper by using a country's con-
tribution to the total production of each commodity instead of a com-
pany or product market share.
Table S10 shows the calculated values for the entropy measure of
diversiﬁcation for the ﬁve commodities and eleven years considered
and these values are presented graphically in Fig. 11. The literature on
this topic does not reveal a classiﬁcation system by which these values
can be deﬁned as indicating a ‘highly concentrated’ market, nor a
threshold below which concern should be raised. However, the table
and ﬁgure do reveal that the closest there has been to a monopoly si-
tuation for these ﬁve commodities was in 1923 when the supply of
nickel has an entropy value of 0.14. As indicated previously, in that
year the largest producer of nickel was Canada with a share of the
global total output of mined nickel of 91%. Since then the entropy value



















Fig. 10. Trends in Kwoka's dominance index, data at decadal intervals * 1974
for lithium (Data from BGS, 2017).
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Lithium too appears to be moving gradually away from a monopoly
situation, although the trend line is more variable than for nickel with
noticeable dips in 1963 and 1983. The former is likely due to the
opening of a new large mine in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) while the
latter is the result of a signiﬁcant increase in production in the U.S.A.
Despite these dips, the entropy measure has not fallen below 0.26 in
any of the years assessed.
The trend for ﬂuorspar is perhaps the most concerning of the ﬁve
commodities because although the entropy measure has risen steadily
from 0.29 in 1913–1.16 in 1973, since then it has fallen sharply to 0.51
in 2013. This indicates that the supply was becoming increasingly di-
verse up until 1973 but has subsequently become more concentrated.
The latter coincides with the emergence of China as the largest pro-
ducer.
4. Discussion
4.1. The eﬀect of changes in the number of producers
A number of measures have been described and calculated to ex-
amine the variation in concentration of the global supply of coal,
copper, ﬂuorspar, lithium and nickel. As previously mentioned, the
number of countries producing each commodity has generally increased
across the century and this will have an eﬀect on indices such as HHI,
Kwoka's dominance index or entropy, irrespective of other factors. In
order to assess how signiﬁcant an impact this has on these three mea-
sures, Fig. 12 show the eﬀect of three scenarios:
1) If the number of producers increases but all producers have equal
market shares;
2) If one producer retains 50% market share but an increasing number
of producers equally share the remaining market; and
3) If two producers retain the majority of the market share but an in-
creasing number of new entrants take small market shares away
from one of them.
A number of observations can be drawn from this scenario analysis.
Firstly, whist an increase in the number of producers intuitively creates
a more diverse market place, the normalised HHI remains at zero if all
the producers continue to have the same market share (red line in
Fig. 12, part 1). In contrast the un-normalised HHI falls markedly as the
number of producers increases (dark blue line in Fig. 12, part 1).
Consequently, where the number of producers changes over time, there
is a clear advantage to using un-normalised HHI rather than the nor-
malised version of the index.
Secondly, where one or two producers remain dominant in a market
despite new entrants, the normalised HHI increases noticeably while
the un-normalised HHI decreases (compare red and dark blue lines in
Fig. 12, parts 2 and 3). The normalised HHI would therefore suggest
that the market is becoming less diverse even though the number of
producers is increasing, which is counter intuitive. Again the un-
normalised HHI would appear to have an advantage over the normal-
ised version of the index.
However, the minimum value that the normalised HHI can reach is
always zero whereas with the un-normalised HHI the minimum value it
can reach varies depending on the number of producers. Therefore, if
the latter is to be used accurately, it is important to plot both the cal-
culated value and the minimum value (based purely on the number of
producers) in order to visually determine the diﬀerence between the
two (compare dark blue and light blue lines in Fig. 12, parts 2 and 3). In
scenario 2 or 3, for example, it can be observed that if one producer
retains 50% of the market whilst new entrants take market share away
from its competitor, the calculated HHI is considerably higher than the
minimum HHI. This means that overall the market is more concentrated
than it would have been if the new entrants had taken market share
away equally from both the original producers.
A similar argument can be made for also plotting the minimum
possible value of the Kwoka's dominance index (compare dark green
and light green lines in Fig. 12, parts 2 and 3). In scenario 2, Kwoka's
dominance index actually rises as the number of producers increases
from 3 to 10, which is a reﬂection of the increasing market share gap
between the largest producer and the others. This situation in the real
world would suggest that the largest producer is increasing in dom-
inance and could therefore exert more inﬂuence than other producers.
However, in scenario 3 Kwoka's dominance index falls slightly as the
number of producers increase, which indicates a reduction in the
dominance of the largest producer. But it is important to recognise that
the reduction is considerably smaller than would be observed if market
shares of all producers remained equal indicating that the new entrants
have not improved the competitive dynamics of the market as much as
the simple increase in the number of producers would suggest.
Plotting the calculated values and maximum values for the entropy
measure of diversiﬁcation is also informative (compare dark purple and
light purple lines in Fig. 12, parts 2 and 3). In Scenario 2 or 3 it would at
ﬁrst appear that the market is naturally becoming more diverse as more
producers enter because the calculated values are increasing. However,
comparison with the maximum entropy values reveals that the increase
is notably smaller (especially in scenario 3) than it would have been if
all market shares had remained equal.
4.2. Interpreting the assessment measures for speciﬁc commodities
Returning to the ﬁve commodities considered by this paper and
examining the indices in turn the following observations can be made.
4.2.1. Fluorspar
The number of ﬂuorspar producers increased signiﬁcantly during
the ﬁrst half of the century, from 3 in 1913 to a maximum of 28 or 29 in
1963–1993, but the number has decreased slightly in the most recent
decades to 24 in 2013. The concentration ratio of the top 4 producers
fell notably between 1913 (when it was 100%) to a low in 1973 of 50%.
However, it has subsequently risen equally notably to 90% in 2013
(Fig. 13, part a). This would imply that the decrease in supply diversity
in recent decades is much more signiﬁcant than the number of produ-
cers metric would suggest. Examination of the percentage market
shares reveals that the dominant producing country in 2013 is China,
contributing 72% to the global total production. The former largest
producer, the USA, has fallen from 66% in 1913 to zero production one
hundred years later.
In the early decades of the century, the gap between the calculated
HHI (un-normalised) and the minimum value possible based on the
number of producers remains relatively constant until 1953 when it
narrows signiﬁcantly. This implies that supply diversity was fairly
constant in the early decades and improved in the middle of the cen-
tury. However, after 1983 the minimum HHI remains ﬂat whilst the
calculated HHI rises considerably, demonstrating that supply has be-















Fig. 11. Trends in entropy measure of diversity, data at decadal intervals *1974
for lithium (Data from BGS, 2017).
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Kwoka's dominance index shows a similar pattern to HHI and clearly
demonstrates that one producer has become dominant in global supply
(Fig. 13, part a). The signiﬁcant change in 1983, is also illustrated in the
calculations for the entropy measure of diversity by a signiﬁcant
widening of the gap between the maximum value based on the number
of producers and the actual calculated value (Fig. 13, part b).
The hypothesis for ﬂuorspar at the outset of this paper was that
supply had become considerably less diverse, with a signiﬁcant shift to
the leading producer and this is clearly supported by the calculations
presented here for the decades since 1983. All of the measures de-
scribed support the same conclusions, although examination of the
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Fig. 12. The eﬀects of increasing numbers of producers on 3 scenarios (see text for details).




The number of producing countries for lithium increased notably
between 1933 and 1943 but has since remained relatively constant at
about 10 ± 2. The concentration ratio for the top 4 producing coun-
tries has remained high (above 85%) in all years, but declined notice-
ably between 1983 (98%) and 1993 (86%) indicating that supply has
become more diverse (Fig. 14, part a). This correlates well with the
commencement of production of lithium from brines beneath saltpans.
The HHI values are considerably more variable for lithium than the
other commodities considered. This probably results from the smaller
number of producers, which means that countries ceasing production or
new entrants have greater impact on the index. However, since a peak
in 1963 the HHI for lithium decreased considerably, which would in-
dicate that global supply has become more diverse (Fig. 14, part a). The
variability seen in HHI is also reﬂected in the data for market share,
with the largest producer varying between four diﬀerent countries since
1933. In 2013 the largest producer was Chile with 47% of global supply
and Australia was the second largest with 28%.
Kwoka's dominance index shows a similar pattern to HHI (Fig. 14,
part a) and this indicates that the dominance held by the largest pro-
ducer in 1963 has largely been eliminated. The index also suggests that
since 1993 no single producer dominated despite Chile's market share
being so signiﬁcant. This is likely to result from Australia's percentage
of global supply increasing since production started in the early 1980s.
The comparison of the calculated entropy with the maximum possible
values suggests that supplies became less diverse between 1943 and
1983 (because the gap is wider) but that since then supplies have di-
versiﬁed as the gap has narrowed (Fig. 14, part b).
At the outset it was thought that the global supplies of lithium had
become less diverse because of the emergence of Chile as a major
producer but the various measures reviewed suggest that the reverse is
true in since 1993. Although examination of market shares would
suggest Chile has a position of strength, Kwoka's dominance index re-
veals that supplies from other countries (e.g. Australia and Argentina)
are preventing Chile's position from becoming dominant.
4.2.3. Coal
The number of coal producers has increased from 34 in 1913 to 69
in 1993 and 2003, with a slight reduction to 66 in 2013. This implies
there has been an increase in supply diversity throughout most of the
last century, albeit with a slight reduction in the most recent decade.
This is supported by the ﬁgures for concentration ratio for the top 4
producers, which has fallen from 84% in 1913 to 56% in 1963 but
subsequently has risen to 73% in 2013 (Fig. 15, part a). The countries
contributing the greatest proportion to the world total supply of coal in
1913 were the USA and the United Kingdom; production from both
have declined over the century although the USA remains the second
largest producer. The leading producer is now China with a market
share of 48% (compared to just 1% in 1913).
HHI (un-normalised) for coal has fallen during the ﬁrst half of the
century, becoming closer to its minimum value for the corresponding






















































Fig. 13. Indices for ﬂuorspar, part a) concentration ratio and market share of largest producer (left hand axis) with un-normalised HHI and Kwoka's dominance index
(right hand axis), part b) entropy measure of diversity (Data from BGS, 2017).
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decades the index has increased. This suggests that global supply was
becoming more diversiﬁed up until the middle of the century but since
1983 it has become more concentrated. Kwoka's dominance index has
also fallen during the ﬁrst half of the century (Fig. 15, part a) but has
increased in more recent decades, particularly between 2003 and 2013.
This indicates that the global supply was free from any producer
dominance in the middle of the century but the largest producer (i.e.
China) is becoming more dominant.
The entropy measure of diversiﬁcation is more challenging to in-
terpret than the other measures because there is a signiﬁcant gap be-
tween the calculated values and the maximum value in all years
(Fig. 15, part b), which implies that the supply of coal was not as di-
verse as the number of producers implied it should be. However, this
gap is widening in 2003 and 2013, which implies a further reduction in
supply diversity in those decades.
At the outset, it was hypothesised that the situation for coal would
be an increase in supply diversity with perhaps one important but not
necessarily dominant producer (i.e. China). However, the results sug-
gest that global supply has become slightly less diverse since 1993 and
that China is becoming more dominant than was previously considered.
However, this conclusion is unlikely to cause concern due to the rela-
tively large number of coal producing countries.
4.2.4. Mine production of copper
Despite a signiﬁcant fall in the number of producing countries be-
tween 1983 and 1993, the general trend has increased, from 23 in 1913
to 54 in 2013. This would imply that global supply is becoming more
diverse. This is supported by the concentration ratio of the top 4 pro-
ducers, which despite some variation over the century has a general
trend that indicates supply has become more diverse (Fig. 16, part a).
A generally declining trend in HHI is interrupted by notable in-
creases in 1943 and 2003 (Fig. 16, part a). A declining trend in HHI
suggests that global supply is becoming more diverse, but the analysis
indicates that this has not been uniform throughout the century.
Kwoka's dominance index shows a signiﬁcant fall over the ﬁrst three
decades of the century, generally low values in the middle of the cen-
tury, but a notable rise in 2003 (Fig. 16, part a). The latter has been
caused by the emergence of Chile as an important copper producer
although it has not yet crossed the threshold to be described as
‘dominant’.
Comparing the calculated entropy measure of diversiﬁcation with
the maximum possible value reveals that there has been only a slight
narrowing of the gap during the middle decades of the last century, but
the gap has subsequently widened again in 2003 and 2013 (Fig. 16, part
b). This indicates that changes in diversity over most of the decades
have not been signiﬁcant.
Although the original hypothesis was that global supply of copper
has become more diverse over the century, this analysis indicates that
in reality the situation is more complicated. Although there are more
countries producing copper in 2013 than in many previous decades, the
emergence of Chile as a major producer appears to have reduced the




















































Fig. 14. Indices for lithium, part a) concentration ratio and market share of largest producer (left hand axis) with un-normalised HHI and Kwoka's dominance index
(right hand axis), part b) entropy measure of diversity (Data from BGS, 2017).
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4.2.5. Mine production of nickel
The number of countries where nickel is mined has increased over
the century from six in 1913 to 27 in 2013, suggesting that supplies
have become much more diverse. Although the number of producers
rose quite quickly, the concentration ratio of the top four producers did
not decline signiﬁcantly until after 1963. Since then it decreased to a
low of 60% by 2003, but has risen to 66% in 2013 (Fig. 17, part a). This
suggests that global supply has become much more diverse, albeit with
perhaps a reduction in diversity in 2013. This conclusion is reinforced
by examination of the market shares of the diﬀerent countries, which
reveals that the proportion of global production supplied by the
dominant producer (Canada) has been repeatedly eroded by new en-
trants. In 1923 Canada supplied 91% of the global market for mined
nickel but in 2013 it supplied just 9% and was the ﬁfth largest producer.
Values for HHI (un-normalised) show a signiﬁcant drop from a peak
of 0.83 in 1923 to 0.14 by 1983 and then a levelling oﬀ with a slight
rise to 0.16 in 2013 (Fig. 17, part a). This suggests supplies have be-
come considerably more diverse during the century. The notable re-
duction in Canada's dominance of global supplies of mined nickel is also
clear in the values for Kwoka's dominance index (Fig. 17, part a). In
1923 this index had a value of 0.69 but by 2003 it had dropped to 0.01.
This is very close to the minimum calculated value for the index of
0.002, which suggests that the market was almost ‘fully diversiﬁed’ in
that year. However, since then the value for Kwoka's dominance index
has risen slightly to 0.05, which reﬂects the growth in the proportion of
the global total supplied by Indonesia (up from 11% in 2003 to 34% in
2013).
A comparison of the calculated value for the entropy of
diversiﬁcation measure with the maximum possible value suggests that
the market for mined nickel was not as close to being ‘fully diversiﬁed’
in 2003 as the Kwoka's index value suggests (Fig. 17, part b). However,
the gap between these two values does narrow, particularly when
comparing 1943 with 2003 for example. The gap widened again in
2013 suggesting supplies became slightly less diverse in the most recent
decade.
The hypothesis was that global supplies of mined nickel had di-
versiﬁed over the century but with no individual country being domi-
nant in recent decades. This is clearly supported by the indices pre-
sented in this paper, albeit with a suggestion of increasing market
strength in 2013 by Indonesia. The situation changed signiﬁcantly in
2014 due to the introduction of new policies in Indonesia that restrict
the exports of unprocessed ores and which have caused a fall in pro-
duction output from that country.
4.3. Sustainability of supply
The supply of minerals has been described as “the end product of
geology” (Institute of Geological Sciences, 1978) and several others
have quoted the phrase “minerals can only be worked where they
naturally occur” (e.g. Weston, 1997; Wrighton et al., 2011); both these
statements are true. Diversity of mineral supply is a direct function of
the variation in geology. Although, in general most mineral commod-
ities are not ‘scarce’, certain mineral deposit types only occur in a re-
stricted number of geographic locations. Therefore, whether a country
is able to supply a particular mineral commodity fundamentally de-






















































Fig. 15. Indices for coal, part a) concentration ratio and market share of largest producer (left hand axis) with un-normalised HHI and Kwoka's dominance index
(right hand axis), part b) entropy measure of diversity (Data from BGS, 2017).
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explored. However, these are just two factors amongst many others that
determine whether a deposit can be mined. Other signiﬁcant factors
include production capacity, material prices, economic or technical
feasibility, environmental policies and geopolitics.
In open-market economies it is usually the companies operating
within a country that determine if it is economically feasible to develop
a mineral resource, but a country's government can strongly inﬂuence
those investment decisions using a range of ﬁnancial or regulatory in-
struments. Many countries have successfully used their mineral re-
sources as a method of improving the standards of living of their po-
pulation, although history suggests this is not always a straightforward
process and the distribution of mineral wealth remains problematic in
many parts of the world. Furthermore, the presence of, or desire to
develop, a particular industry within a country will inﬂuence the range
of minerals considered to be ‘important’ to a particular country.
Consequently even if a mineral is assessed as being at risk of supply
disruption it may not necessarily be of concern to a country if it does
not have an industry that uses that material. However, even if a mineral
is only used in small quantities this does not necessarily indicate that it
is ‘unimportant’, it may actually be vital to the functioning of a parti-
cular industry or technology, and the requirement for that commodity
can sometimes grow signiﬁcantly and rapidly.
Economic growth generates increased demand for mineral raw
materials. The development of domestic industries, especially in the so-
called ‘emerging’ economies, increases demand further and this has
been particularly important in the last two decades. It is logical for a
nation rich in minerals to encourage the development of domestic
industries that are further along the processing chain because these
industries create employment for the local population and generally
create higher proﬁts and tax revenues. However, the imposition of
policies to accomplish this are often derided as ‘resource nationalism’
because all countries are dependent to some degree on supplies of raw
materials from other countries. If one country chooses to conserve its
mineral production for its own domestic industry, this inevitably means
a reduction in supply for other countries. Ensuring a sustainable and
‘fair’ supply of raw materials is highly topical with many countries
developing policies and strategies to improve raw material security of
supply, for example the European Commission's Raw Materials
Initiative (European Commission, 2008).
Statistical measures of supply concentration or diversity, such as
those described and assessed in this paper, can make a useful con-
tribution to the development and monitoring of policies or strategies by
indicating which minerals these should focus on. The use of these in-
dices are an eﬀective ‘early warning’ mechanism that will highlight
which minerals would beneﬁt most from more detailed analysis
(McCullough and Nasser, 2017). However, it is important that the
conclusions drawn from indices such as those in this paper and the
associated messages to decision-makers are not misleading. Further-
more, this paper demonstrates that applying a single diversity measure
might not provide suﬃcient information for the position to be com-
pletely understood and as a consequence an important change in the
market for a particular mineral could potentially be missed. For ex-
ample, simply looking at the number of producers for a mineral is in-
























































Fig. 16. Indices for mine production of copper, part a) concentration ratio and market share of largest producer (left hand axis) with un-normalised HHI and Kwoka's
dominance index (right hand axis), part b) entropy measure of diversity (Data from BGS, 2017).
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a useful tool for examining supply concentration but the complications
described previously may not always be fully understood by non-spe-
cialists. Kwoka's dominance index goes further than HHI in that it
identiﬁes whether a market has a producer with a position of strength
or dominance that could be exploited. Changes in the index over time
can serve to highlight whether a producer is increasing in dominance,
which may be cause for concern and thereby serve as an early warning
that policy actions are necessary. The entropy measure of diversiﬁca-
tion could also be used to determine whether a market is becoming
more or less concentrated but the eﬀect of increasing the number of
producers is much more signiﬁcant than with other indices and con-
sequently it is vital that the maximum value is calculated to enable a
comparison to be drawn between this and the observed value.
When considering changes in mineral supply diversity, it is im-
portant to avoid the issue of false precision. Calculating a ﬁgure using a
complicated index may make the result appear to be very precise and
there is a tendency to assume that greater precision is the same as
greater accuracy. However, the interpretation of a complicated index
will lead to the same basic conclusion as that reached using a simpler
calculation, as illustrated by comparing the trends in Figs. 13–17, and
the accuracy is no diﬀerent. The index ﬁgure calculated using HHI, for
example, is not providing anything really diﬀerent than a ﬁgure cal-
culated more quickly using a simpler concentration ratio or the market
share of the largest producer.
The setting of thresholds is of greater importance for determining
whether a market is ‘concentrated’ or ‘highly concentrated’. If these are
set too low the position for many minerals will appear to be more
concerning than would otherwise be the case. Conversely, if the
thresholds are set too high then important supply risks could be missed.
Although the setting of these thresholds is inevitably arbitrary, it is a
crucial step and it is vital that the thresholds applied in any study are
always clearly stated to allow objective comparison with other studies
that have been completed or may be undertaken in the future. The
thresholds mentioned in Section 3.3 in relation to the UK's CMA are
established by laws and regulations for company mergers at both na-
tional and European levels (Competition and Market Authority, 2010).
In contrast, the reasoning behind the selection of thresholds for the EU's
criticality studies is not speciﬁed (EC, 2010, 2014, 2017).
The setting of thresholds is directly related to the use of a ‘criticality
matrix’ whereby the risk of supply disruption is plotted along one axis
of a diagram against some measure of the impact of that disruption on
the other. In EC (2010, 2014 or 2017) this second axis is ‘economic
importance’ but other studies refer to it as ‘impact’ or ‘vulnerability’
(NRC, 2008; Glöser et al., 2015). The use of linear thresholds for the
two axes in such a diagram divides the matrix into four blocks as illu-
strated by Frenzel et al. (2017) but in reality the level of criticality is a
graduated scale and not something that is binary, i.e. ‘critical’ or ‘not
critical’ (Graedel et al., 2014). Furthermore, both Frenzel et al. (2017)
and Glöser et al. (2015) suggest that a line linking points of equivalent
‘criticality’ in such a matrix ideally should not be linear but curved,
which suggests that the thresholds used in such diagrams should simi-
larly be curved. As noted earlier, a statistical index for mineral supply
diversity can be used on its own as an ‘early warning’ mechanism and






















































Fig. 17. Indices for mine production of nickel, part a) concentration ratio and market share of largest producer (left hand axis) with un-normalised HHI and Kwoka's
dominance index (right hand axis), part b) entropy measure of diversity (Data from BGS, 2017).
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would be adequate. However, studies that consider two or more di-
mensions simultaneously would beneﬁt from a more detailed ex-
amination of the appropriateness of any thresholds selected.
Although the calculation of a mineral supply diversity indicator at
one point in time may reveal a ‘snapshot’ of the position in that market
at that particular time, it is the trend in the indicator that is most in-
formative. The perception that the supply of a mineral has become
more concentrated may not represent the reality if the position is ex-
amined over a longer time frame. A gradual change in an indicator to
suggest that one supplying country is becoming more dominant may
not require any particular policy action to be taken, but over a longer
time period that gradual change may appear more signiﬁcant.
Conversely, a dramatic or signiﬁcant change in an indicator over a short
time period may suggest that an urgent response is required whereas in
the context of a longer time frame the change may not seem as severe.
Datasets containing annualised data over long time periods, such as the
World Mineral Statistics dataset used in this paper, are essential to
allow these trends to be calculated over suﬃcient time periods.
5. Conclusions
The examination of mineral supply concentration or diversity is
important because increased concentration will increase the risk of
potential supply disruption, whether due to a natural causes (e.g.
earthquake or volcanic eruption), social upheaval (e.g. worker strike) or
geopolitics (e.g. resource nationalism). However, supply concentration
only becomes an issue if a supplier holds a dominant position in a
market because that country could potentially exert inﬂuence over the
availability or price of that mineral. The presence of dominance does
not itself result in anti-competitive practices rather it is the abuse of
dominance that causes problems.
Statistical measures of concentration and dominance, such as those
assessed in this paper, are useful for determining which minerals are at
greater relative supply risk or for providing an early warning me-
chanism. As a consequence of these kinds of results, national or inter-
national policies or strategies can be focussed on reducing the risk ei-
ther by increasing supply diversity or mitigation actions. However, it is
important that they are used and interpreted correctly and that dif-
ferent measures are applied in combination to ensure the full com-
plexity of global mineral supply is considered.
Analysis of the global production for ﬁve mineral commodities at
key intervals over the last 100 years provides new insight into how
mineral supply concentration has evolved over the last century. This
analysis is only possible due to the existence of continuous and con-
sistent datasets such as the BGS “World Mineral Statistics”.
A number of statistical measures were used to examine supply
concentration and dominance: the number of producers, concentration
ratio of the top 4 producing countries, normalised and un-normalised
HHI, percentage market share, Kwoka's dominance index and the en-
tropy measure of diversiﬁcation. Although HHI, Kwoka's index and the
entropy measure appear to provide greater precision, they are more
complicated to calculate and more diﬃcult to interpret correctly, par-
ticularly when the number of producers is changing over time. Similar
trends can be observed by calculating concentration ratios and market
shares, which are simpler to calculate and more intuitive for non-spe-
cialists. A relative comparison of the diﬀerent measures is summarised
graphically in Fig. 18.
The setting of an appropriate threshold for determining levels of
‘high concentration’ is of greater importance than the selection of a
particular index. Although this is generally done arbitrarily, on the
basis of ‘expert’ opinion, the level at which it is set will have a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the interpretation of the results.
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